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Abstract
In a two-step econometric approach that corrects for selectivity bias, we analyze the 
determinants of the probability of succession and the timing of succession or closure in a 
unique sample of 233 North-German family farms. We set up the succession decision as an 
intertemporal optimization problem. The empirical results show that larger and more 
profitable farms which are specialized in dairy production are significantly more likely to 
have an intra-family successor. We find that a non-agricultural education of the current 
manager or the successor delay succession. When the family decided to stop farming 
operations, a non-agricultural education of the owner delays closure of the farm. Closure 
occurs earlier if the manager is able to lease out the land in the process of retirement. 
Although farm households react to incentives originating from tax and pension regulations, 
many important determinants of succession are beyond the control of policymakers.
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Probability and Timing of Succession or Closure in Family Firms:
A Switching Regression Analysis of Farm Households in Germany
Abstract
In a two-step econometric approach that corrects for selectivity bias, we analyze the 
determinants of the probability of succession and the timing of succession or closure in a 
unique sample of 233 North-German family farms. The succession decision is set up as an 
intertemporal optimization problem. The empirical results show that larger and more 
profitable farms which are specialized in dairy production are significantly more likely to 
have an intra-family successor. We find that a non-agricultural education of the current 
manager or the successor delay succession. When the family decided to stop farming 
operations, a non-agricultural education of the owner delays closure of the farm. Closure 
occurs earlier if the manager is able to lease out the land in the process of retirement. 
Although farm households react to incentives originating from tax and pension regulations, 
many important determinants of succession are beyond the control of policymakers.
I. Introduction
In recent years, family firms have received growing attention in economics. Most firms in the 
world are family firms. Gersick et al. (1997) report that family firms account for 65-80% of 
all worldwide business, and for about 40% of the Fortune 500 companies. Although many 
family firms are small, in aggregate they represent about half of the U.S. gross domestic 
product (Aronoff, Astrachan and Ward 1997) and employ over 80% of the work force 
(Neuberg and Lank, 1998). 
The focus of our investigation is on one particular aspect of family firms: the issue of 
family succession. In an extensive review of the existing research, Handler (1994) finds that 
‘researchers in the field of family business agree that succession is the most important issue 
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3
that most family firms face’ (p. 133).1 However, the importance of family firms and family 
succession differs between economies and in particular between different sectors within the 
economy. By studying occupations of different family members (grandfathers, fathers, and 
sons), Laband and Lentz (1983) find that farmers’ are nearly five times more likely to have 
followed in their fathers’ footsteps than non-farm proprietors. It should thus come as no 
surprise that a large share of the literature on succession focuses on the farm sector. This 
interest is partly fuelled by the importance of succession decisions for the pace of structural 
change in agriculture. Family-operated enterprises dominate the farming sectors in West-
European and North American countries, indeed in most countries of the world, and have 
been the target of extensive policy intervention, for example in the framework of the Common 
Agricultural Policy of the European Union (EU).
Empirical studies on succession in the farm sector have typically examined single 
aspects of the probability and the timing of family takeover. Because most studies made use 
of already existing census or survey data sets, the choice of determinants to be examined was 
usually restricted. Well-examined variables include the age structure and years of general 
schooling of household members. In an early study of the probability of family succession 
among German farms, Pfeffer (1989) found that older farmers and farm households with a 
smaller potential workforce (in terms of family members) are less likely to expect the 
continuation of their farm. Analyzing actual farm successions on the basis of census data for 
Upper Austria, Stiglbauer and Weiss (2000) showed that an increase in farm and family size, 
as well as a higher degree of on-farm diversification, raises the probability of farm succession 
within the family. Kimhi and Nachlieli (2001) identified parents’ age, age difference to 
children and the farm owner’s years of schooling to be among the statistically most important 
1 Succession is so central that Ward (1987) chooses to define family firms in terms of 
the potential for succession: ‘we define a family business as one that will be passed on for the 
family’s next generation to manage and control’ (p. 252)
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determinants of the probability to declare a successor in a set of Israeli family farms. Glauben, 
Tietje, and Weiss (2004), one of the first studies based on specifically collected survey data 
from Austria, found that large and specialized farms are more likely to be transferred within 
the family and to have appointed a successor.
By focusing on the timing of farm succession, Kimhi (1994) examined actual farm 
transfers on the basis of census data for Israel. The author found that the transfer time 
decreases with parents’ age and with a child’s years of schooling, but increases with parents’ 
experience. Using survey data for 469 Maryland farmers, Kimhi and Lopez (1997) also found 
that older farm operators plan to retire later, as do more educated and wealthier farmers. On 
the basis of the same data set, Kimhi and Lopez (1999) investigated the importance of 
succession considerations for retirement plans of farmers relative to other personal 
considerations. Succession considerations were found to be more important for older and 
better educated farmers. Glauben, Tietje, and Weiss (2004) confirmed that the time of 
succession is delayed as the age of the farm operator increases. 
Given this body of evidence, we extend the literature in a number of ways. Whereas 
previous work has focused on single aspects of the succession decision, this is the first study 
that analyses the probability of farming succession and timing of succession and closure 
simultaneously for the same dataset. In particular, the timing of closure of the farm, should 
there be no successor, has not systematically been investigated in the literature so far.
Furthermore, contrary to most earlier work, we make use of data specifically collected 
for the purpose of this study. Our dataset consists of cross-sectional survey data for 233 farms 
in Northern Germany, which was collected in 2003. Individual observations were then 
matched with accounting data for the same farms, covering the period from 1998 to 2001. 
This specific dataset allows us to statistically verify the importance of previously neglected 
factors influencing the succession decision-complex, for example concerning the role of 
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5
occupation-specific education of parents and successors, the role of age and health 
considerations of parents, or the relevance of tax and pension regulations, and at the same 
time control for certain farm characteristics such as profitability and size, based on the 
accounting data. 
Our methodological approach assembles techniques used in previous research on the 
subject to analyze both the probability and timing of succession or closure in a consistent 
setting. It is a two-stage switching regression model with sample selection, initially proposed 
by Heckman (1979). In the first stage, a Probit model analyzing the probability of intra-family 
succession is estimated. In the second stage, two separate equations for the timing of 
succession and closure are estimated, which are corrected for selectivity bias arising from 
endogenous group selection.
In the following section II, we first motivate our analysis with a simple dynamic 
model of farm succession and a discussion of potential determinants. The dataset is described 
in the subsequent section III. Section IV presents the methodology and the empirical results 
and section V concludes.
II. A dynamic model of farm succession
Theoretical research suggests a number of explanations for the prevalence of succession 
within the family. A first is that parents transmit to their offsprings valuable work experience, 
reputation, and other managerial human capital (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1985). In addition, 
maintaining family control has a symbolic importance to many farm households and thus, the 
transfer of the farm to the next generation is often seen as a key objective of farmers (Gasson 
and Errington 1993; Blanc and Perrier-Cornet 1993). Pesquin, Kimhi and Kislev (1999) point 
out that intra-family succession enables the family to realize benefits from intergenerational 
risk-sharing when annuity markets are incomplete. It provides an often implicit contractual 
insurance arrangement since the generations overlap and share income. The authors mention 
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additional advantages of intra-family farm succession such as ‘smooth’ transition, reduction 
in transfer cost, and lower transfer taxes. 
We assume that a farm household consists of members of two generations, parents and 
successors, who jointly decide about the optimal timing of the succession decision, s. s is a 
trivariate control variable that, in each period, assumes one of three states: (1) the farm is 
transferred to a successor, (2) farming is exited without a successor and the farm is being 
dissolved, (3) the decision is delayed for another period. Both (1) and (2) are irreversible. 
Once one of these two options is performed, no further modification of s can be made. At a 
given period in time, the household derives utility from the level of its income-generating 
assets, tA , and from the current status of the decision variable, ts , so that ),( ttt sAuu = , 
where u is a differentiable utility function. The household may have preferences for a specific 
status of s, particularly for transferring the farm to the next generation and hence keeping the 
farming tradition intact. Income-generating assets include the physical and financial capital 
stock of the farm-household and the human capital of its members. These assets evolve 
through time according to a differentiable household production function f, 
),(1 ttt sAfA =+ .
The latter implies that the succession decision has relevance for the development of the 
household’s assets through time, for example because it is a signal for the accumulation of 
specific human capital of the successor generation.
Given a time discount factor  , the household’s problem is then to find the optimal 
growth path of the state variable x by making decisions on s:
),(),(max 11 +++= tttt
s
sAusAuU
t
 .
By applying standard dynamic programming techniques and assuming there exists an interior 
solution (Chow 1997, 7-8), the following Bellman equation results:
{ })(),(max)( 1++= ttt
s
t AVsAuAV
t
 ,
Page 6 of 24
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
7
where V is the maximised utility or value function of the household. The solution to this 
control problem yields the optimal timing of succession or farm closure, T, relative to the 
starting point. If option (1) is in the optimal set of s for any t, there will be family succession 
in period ST , otherwise the farm will be closed in period CT . In case that the parents die, the 
successors are naturally forced to make a decision on their own.2
Whether there will be succession and when is determined by a vector of variables, x, 
that influence the initial level of household assets (including both on-farm and off-farm 
assets), the production function, and utility shifters (Kimhi and Nachlieli 2001). The latter 
may include a particular preference for continuing the farming tradition within the family, or 
existing health issues of parents. x also contains variables characterising the existing legal 
framework concerning succession decisions, for example with regard to tax or public pension 
regulations. These variables determine the pay-offs of succession and next-best alternatives in 
the current and future time periods and can be grouped in four categories: (I) parents’ 
characteristics, including age and education, (II) potential successor’s characteristics, 
including sex and education, (III) farm characteristics, including profitability measures and 
specialisation, and (IV) specific intra-family issues concerning the succession decision, 
including the relevance of farming tradition. These aspects will be made operational in the 
subsequent analysis.
Following Kimhi and Nachlieli (2001), we may define SV  as the present value of 
household utility if there is succession, and CV  if there is not. These define a latent tendency 
to make a decision in favour of intra-family succession, CS VVW =* , which is determined 
by a subset of x. Let z denote the subset of x that determines whether there will be succession 
or not, Sx  the subset that determines the timing ST  if there is succession, and Cx  the subset 
that determines the timing of closure, CT . The subsets of exogenous variables may partly 
2 The formal model abstracts from risk considerations that may affect on- and off-farm 
labour allocation decisions of parents or successors (Key, Roberts, and O’Donoghue, 2006).
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overlap. Furthermore, define iW  as a dichotomous variable observed for farm i, for which 
1=iW  if 0
* >iW , and 0 otherwise. Considering our decision model as a stochastic process, 
we may then write the estimating reduced-form equations as follows.
iii vzW += '
*  , (1)
if 1=iW , 
S
i
S
i
SS
i xT 	
 += ' , and (2)
if 0=iW , 
C
i
C
i
CC
i xT 	
 += ' . (3)
,,
S
  and C
  are parameter vectors to be estimated, Siiv 	, , and 
C
i	  are disturbance terms. 
The timing of succession is observed if family succession is likely, otherwise the timing of 
closure is observed. For the actual estimation it is convenient (and standard) to assume that 
both pairs [ ]Siiv 	,  and [ ]Ciiv 	,  follow a bivariate normal distribution with zero means and 
correlations S  and C  (see e.g. Manrique and Ojah 2003).
III. Data
The analysis of inter-generational succession is based on a set of 233 German farm 
households surveyed in the state of Schleswig-Holstein in 2003. The focus was on older, full-
time farm operators. The farm owners were asked about their farm transfer plans and several 
personal and household characteristics. In particular, the respondents were asked to indicate 
which of the following alternatives best describes their actual plans: (a) succession within the 
family is very likely, (b) succession within the family is rather likely, (c) we have not made 
any specific successions plans and don’t know, (d) succession within the family is unlikely, 
and (e) succession within the family will not take place. We merge the statements (a) and (b) 
to obtain an indicator of ‘family succession is likely’ and the statements (c) to (e) to ‘family 
succession is unlikely’. Note that about 70% of all respondents reported that family 
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9
succession is likely.3   In addition, farmers were asked to report the number of years until they 
plan to stop operating the farm, from which information on the timing of succession (or 
timing of farm exits) was derived. 
The survey data also includes a range of variables on personal characteristics of 
parents and successors. Moreover, several subjective assessments concerning farmers’ 
attitudes towards farming and succession in general were collected. These were usually 
measured on a five-point scale, which is considered more meaningful than the otherwise often 
used dummy variables. This study gains additional advantage form the fact that the survey 
data has been linked to individual accounting data for the period 1998 to 2001 in order to get 
more reliable information on the financial situation of the farm. We use average values for the 
four year period in order to reduce the impact of short-run fluctuations in the variables used. 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis. 
Unfortunately, only a fraction of farm operators have reported the planned time of retirement. 
Thus the sample for the estimations regarding the timing equations is reduced to 181 
observations. 
Include table 1 around here
IV. Methods and empirical results
In the following, we show the results of a two-step estimation of equations (1) to (3) based on 
Heckman (1979). In the first stage, eq. (1) is estimated as a Probit model. The estimates are 
then used to calculate observation-specific Inverse Mills Ratios, which allow to test and 
correct for selectivity bias in ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions of eqs. (2) and (3). 
Because characteristics of farms where succession is likely are expected to differ significantly 
3 One might argue that category (c) ‘no decision made yet’ should be treated as a third 
category. We therefore experimented with a multinomial logit model, where statements (a) 
and (b), and (d) and (e) were summarized and evaluated against alternative (c). Based on a 
Wald Category Test we found the probit specification to be the most appropriate specification.
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and non-randomly from those without succession, selectivity is an important issue to be dealt 
with.4 As a consequence of this procedure, standard errors of the second stage regression have 
to be adjusted for heteroscedasticity and the presence of estimated parameters.
The results of the econometric analysis are shown in Table 2. The estimated models 
are statistically significant at the 1% level or better, as measured by the likelihood ratio and F-
tests. The Probit model correctly classifies 85.5% of cases with ‘family succession is likely’ 
and 73.1% of observations with ‘family succession is unlikely’. Adjusted R²’s reveal a fairly 
good fit of the OLS models. The effect of the Inverse Mills Ratios in both second-stage 
regressions is statistically significantly different from zero, implying a positive correlation 
among error terms of the first and second stage. Neglecting this selectivity would therefore 
result in biased estimates.
Include table 2 around here
In the following, we analyze the results by groups of variables, as defined in section II.  
We start with the characteristics of parents. Given the evidence summarized in section I, it 
should come as no surprise that the age of the farm operator is of particular importance for the 
succession decision. All three models reveal a highly significant influence, whereby farms 
with older managers are more likely to have a successor, but both succession and closure will 
be earlier. The results concerning timing are immediately plausible, because operation must 
be stopped at some time when the current manager becomes older. Furthermore, as the age of 
4 An alternative approach to analyse equations (2) and (3) would be by means of 
duration analysis (Kiefer 1988; Diaz 1999). This has the advantage that the consequences of 
the time-dependent process for the structure of the error terms can explicitly be taken into 
account. We experimented with parametric accelerated failure time models. However, these 
models turned out to be much less able to isolate the effects of  single determinants, perhaps 
because they impact on the duration only indirectly, by ‘rescaling’ the time axis of the hazard 
function. Furthermore, there is no established way of dealing with selectivity bias in these 
models. Finally, because an inspection of residuals did not reveal any irregularities for 
equations (2) and (3), we decided to choose the standard procedure based on normality of 
error terms. 
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the farm operator increases, he/she will be more aware of the need to make succession plans 
and more prepared to make irreversible long-run decisions (Kimhi and Nachlieli 2001), thus 
the positive ‘age/succession’ relationship. Younger farmers, on the other hand, may still be 
more willing and flexible to react to recently increased income pressure on farm households 
by recommending their children to give up farming altogether.
In contrast to several earlier studies (Laband and Lentz 1983; Stiglbauer and Weiss 
2000; Kimhi and Nachlieli 2001, Glauben, Tietje and Weiss 2004), we could not verify a non-
linear relationship between age and succession decisions. This was due to the 
multicollinearity of regressors, given a relatively small sample size.
Parents’ educational level potentially affects the return to farming under their (as 
opposed to their heirs’) management (Kimhi 1994). Contrary to earlier studies, we explicitly 
differentiate between specialist education in agriculture and non-agricultural education. 
However, no statistically significant effect of the level of agricultural education could be 
identified in the present data. A higher level of non-agricultural education on the other hand 
significantly delays the transition of the farm. We interpret this as (indirect) evidence for the 
stabilizing effect non-agricultural activities of the farm manager have on the farming 
enterprise. This effect is documented, in particular for part-time farms, by Pfeffer (1989) and 
Kimhi (2000). Because 71% of respondents in the present sample did not work off-farm at all, 
the effect is only weak here, and an impact of hours of off-farm employment on succession 
decisions could not be detected in our analysis.
A specific advantage of the data used for this analysis is that it includes statements of 
farmers concerning the importance of several criteria for the timing of the transfer decision. 
These criteria, although plausible on theoretical grounds, have received little attention in the 
empirical literature so far. We first focus on the role parents’ personal physical conditions 
play in the timing of transition. During the interviews, respondents were asked to assess the 
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importance of age and health issues for the succession decision. Secondly, we examined the 
relevance of income tax legislation and public old-age pension regulations. In Germany, there 
are various ways in which farm succession can lead to tax benefits for the family of the farm 
owner. For example, rental or usufruct agreements with the successor may mitigate the 
progression of income tax or allow the multiple use of tax allowances (Köhne and Wesche 
1995). Furthermore, there is a highly subsidized old-age pension system for German farmers. 
Apart from age requirements, one of the conditions for receiving benefits from this system is 
that the farm was transferred to the successor. The respondents assessed the relevance of all 
these criteria for their timing decision on a five-point scale from totally irrelevant to very 
relevant.
The regression analysis shows that these factors have a significant impact on the 
timing. Parents who consider age as an important factor transfer the farm later to their 
successors. Furthermore, farmers for whom health challenges are a relevant criterion close the 
farm later if there is no successor. Among those who transfer the farm to a successor, the 
perceived importance of tax regulations significantly accelerates succession, whereas pension 
requirements lead to a delay.5 Compared to a hypothetical farmer’s family with an average 
score for each criterion, managers thus transfer later who consider personal physical 
conditions as important. This finding suggests that these respondents are usually not affected 
by current age or health challenges and see no reason for an early transfer. However, the 
estimates are consistent with the view that farmers with a particular desire to have access to 
old-age pensions are forced to delay succession until the necessary retirement age is reached. 
On the other hand, potential tax benefits from succession arrangements do provide incentives 
for immediate action and thus induce parents to transfer the farm earlier. The highly 
significant effect of the importance of health for the closure of the farm indicates that current 
5 A very detailed empirical analysis of the impact of an early retirement program on farm succession in 
Finland is provided in Pietola, Väre, and Lansink (2003). The authors find that the timing and type of farmer exit 
decisions respond elastically to the economic environment, and to farmer and farm characteristics. 
Page 12 of 24
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
13
operators have a desire to continue to work on the farm as long as their health permits, which 
in this case is not affected by any strategic considerations concerning an early transfer to a 
successor.
We next turn to the characteristics of potential successors. A first variable that is 
established in the literature is the age differential between parents and children as their 
potential successors, measured as the age difference to the oldest child.  The difference is 
expected to be negatively correlated with a decision in favor of succession, because children 
may be too young and still unwilling to make a long-term decision on this matter (Kimhi and 
Nachlieli 2001). This is confirmed by our Probit estimates. In addition, families with younger 
children may be more flexible to adjust the career plans for children to deteriorating pay-offs 
from agriculture. However, the age differential is also highly correlated with the age of the 
current manager, so that multicollinearity of regressors prevented to include this variable in 
the second-stage models.
Section II suggests that the number of years until succession takes place decreases 
with the expected returns a successor may derive from farming. Key for this is the human 
capital of successors. However, we are not aware of a study that has tested the influence of a 
specialist training of successors in agricultural vs. non-agricultural occupations. Our dataset 
allowed us to include variables measuring agricultural and non-agricultural education of 
designated successors in the timing of succession equation (the variable is only available for 
this subgroup). Both have the expected sign, showing that successors with agricultural 
education take over the farm earlier, whereas a non-agricultural education delays succession. 
Only the latter effect is statistically significant at the five percent level, however.
Following previous empirical studies (Kimhi and Nachlieli 2001), we find the number 
of male and female children to influence succession considerations. The probability of 
succession is negatively related to the number of daughters. This might be due to the concept 
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of sons as ‘preferred successors’, according to which parents have a preference for dealing 
with their son as opposed to their son-in-law as a future owner of the farm. Moreover, 
daughters may be less willing to continue to make a living from agriculture at all.6
The next group of variables includes several farm characteristics. In contrast to other 
studies, the present analysis is partly based on accounting data to measure financial and size 
characteristics of farms. More profitable farms report a significantly higher probability of 
being transferred within the family. Similarly, Kimhi and Nachlieli (2001), Glauben, Tietje 
and Weiss (2004), and Hennessy (2002) report that the likelihood of succession increases with 
some measure of farm income. These farms hold the best prospect of providing the 
succeeding child a reasonable and secure income in future. Concerning timing, one should 
expect the willingness of the heir to take over the farm as soon as possible to increase. On the 
other hand, a healthy financial performance of the farm may motivate the (successful) current 
farm operator to delay the transfer decision. Viewed from the current farm operator’s 
perspective only, Kimhi and Lopez (1997) argue that it is not possible to show whether 
succession will be earlier or later in the presence of binding borrowing constraints. In line 
with this view, we find no significant effect of profitability on the timing of transition. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, low profitability also does not accelerate the process of farm closure.
For a given profitability, the probability of succession significantly increases with the 
amount of land owned by the farm. Land assets reflect the value of the farm and the (inter-
generational) transfer. Further, more land also facilitates to overcome borrowing constraints 
and thus reduces restrictions to future farm growth. Thus, the higher the amount of land, the 
larger will be the willingness of the potential successor to take over the farm.  However, 
timing is not affected by the size of landholdings. Only another size indicator, the full-time 
labor equivalents currently employed on the farm, do accelerate the transfer to a successor. 
6 Kröhnert et al. (2005) document that young women are systematically more likely to 
leave rural areas in Germany than men.
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This may indicate a higher value of the farm, but also the need for restructuring of work 
processes.
A further characteristic that makes succession significantly more likely is a 
specialization in dairy production. As argued by Kimhi and Nachlieli (2001), this 
specialization may work in favor of succession for two reasons: first, dairy farms allow a 
convenient division of labor among generations, which is why parents have an incentive to 
make an early commitment to hand over the farm to a successor. Second, dairy operations 
provide a more stable source of income than, for example, plant production activities, which 
makes these types of farms more attractive for successors.
We finally look at a number of specific issues concerning succession and closure 
covered by the survey. Research in sociology stresses that the choice of becoming a farmer is 
strongly influenced by family traditions. Tradition also plays an important role in farm 
succession considerations in Germany. The longer a farm has been operated by the same 
family, the higher is the probability of being transferred to the next generation. Whereas the 
statistical significance of the latter effect is only weak, traditional farming families also tend 
to hand over the farm later, should there be a successor. This may be due to a particularly 
strong bargaining position of the current manager on traditional family farms, an attitude that 
is likely to be passed on to succeeding generations.7
The survey also provides a set of variables that is related to the decision to close the 
farm without a successor. These were included in the second-stage regression on the timing of 
closure. The first two concern the way the farm is going to be dissolved during closure, in 
particular whether the land is leased out or sold. They show that closure occurs earlier if the 
land is leased out, whereas the sale of land does not affect closure timing. The former finding 
7 The impact of parents’ attitudes on the childrens’ views in the German agricultural 
sector is well documented in Neldert et al. (1981).
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is consistent with the view that leasing out land is usually involving lower transaction costs 
than selling it, which accelerates the process. Furthermore, retiring farmers may feel more 
comfortable with the somewhat reversible decision to lease out the land, as opposed to the 
final sale of land, and thus be more willing to close farming operations. Another variable 
measured whether the current manager has a preference for continuing active farming as long 
as possible, that is for example as long as personal physical conditions allow this. Quite 
plausibly, these farmers tend to close the farm later, a result that is consistent with the earlier 
finding that health considerations are a dominant criterion for the timing of closure.
V. Conclusions 
In a two-step econometric approach that corrects for selectivity bias, we have analyzed the 
determinants of the probability of succession and the timing of succession or closure in North-
German family farms. We set up the succession decision as an intertemporal optimization 
problem. The solution to this problem is determined by the relative pay-offs of parents and 
heirs from agricultural vs. non-agricultural income generation. Taken together, the empirical 
results show that larger (in terms of farm-owned land holdings) and more profitable farms 
which are specialized in dairy production are significantly more likely to have an intra-family 
successor. In addition, the timing of succession is strongly affected by the age of the current 
manager. Whereas this confirms findings from studies on other regions or countries, we also 
provide unique evidence that succession will be accelerated if the manager has no non-
agricultural education (and thus no possible way to generate off-farm income), if the current 
manager has a particular interest in benefits from income tax regulations in the course of 
succession, if the designated successor has no specific training in a non-agricultural 
occupation, if the farm employs more labor equivalents, and if the tradition of farming in the 
family is less pronounced.
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As a further contribution to the literature, we find that, if there is no intra-family 
successor, additional non-agricultural education of the manager delays closure of the farm. 
We suggest that this is due to the stabilizing effect of non-agricultural incomes on farming 
operations. Even so, closure occurs earlier if the manager is able and willing to lease out land 
in the process of retirement, as opposed to selling it, and if he/she does not have a particular 
preference for continuing active farming as long as physiologically possible. 
The objectives of public policies with regard to structural change in the agricultural 
sector have not always been clear and consistent (cf. Thomson and Psaltopoulos 2004 for the 
EU). If it is a policy goal to accelerate structural change by fostering farm exits in the process 
of retirement of current operators, this study provides two messages how this may or may not 
be achieved. The first is that farm households do react to financial incentives. Income 
pressure, a variable that used to be strongly affected by policy measures in the past, makes 
exit more likely indeed. To the extent that future policy reforms lower agricultural incomes, 
exit rates will increase. Furthermore, we provide evidence that farmers do perceive incentives 
originating from income tax and old-age pension regulations, and show that these incentives 
have an effect on the timing of succession. However, the second message is that many other 
important determinants of succession identified in this study, such as age structure of the farm 
household, age and health issues of parents, and the sex composition of children, are largely 
beyond the control of policymakers. This restricts the scope for active structural policy in the 
agricultural sector.
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Tables
Table 1: Description of variables
Entire sample Farms where 
succession is 
likely
Farms where 
succession is 
unlikely
Mean Std. 
dev.
Min. Max. Mean Std. 
dev.
Mean Std. 
dev.
Dependent variables
Family succession is likely (0/1) 0.7 0.5 0 1 - - - -
Years until succession or closure 8.2 6.1 0 30 6.3 4.5 13.4 7.0
Parents’ characteristics
Age of current farm manager (years) 51.9 6.9 34.0 65.0 53.9 6.1 49.1 7.0
Agricultural education of current manager (0..4)1 1.9 0.8 0 4 1.9 0.8 2.1 0.9
Non-agricultural education of current manager (0..4)1 0.2 0.6 0 4 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.3
Off-farm employment of current manager (hours/month) 10.7 26.1 0.0 200.0 12.0 28.8 11.6 27.9
Current manager perceives own age as an important criterion for 
timing of succession (1..5) 2
4.0 1.0 1 5 4.0 1.1 4.4 0.7
Current manager perceives own health as an important criterion for 
timing of succession (1..5) 2
3.8 1.1 1 5 3.8 1.2 4.1 1.0
Current manager perceives income tax regulations as an important 
criterion for timing of succession (1..5) 2
2.5 1.3 1 5 2.6 1.3 2.7 1.3
Current manager perceives public pension regulations as an important 
criterion for timing of succession (1..5) 2
2.9 1.4 1 5 3.2 1.4 3.0 1.3
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Potential successors’ characteristics
Age difference to oldest child (years) 28.8 4.5 15.0 43.0 - - - -
Successor has agricultural education (0/1) - - - - 0.9 0.4 - -
Successor has non-agricultural education (0/1) - - - - 0.4 0.5 - -
Number of sons 1.4 0.9 0 4 - - - -
Number of daughters 1.1 0.9 0 3 - - - -
Farm characteristics
Farm profit (‘000 EUR, av. 1998-2001) 61.2 54.4 -26.3 409.7 63.6 54.5 57.2 44.1
Farm-owned landholdings (ha, av. 1998-2001) 56.8 44.2 0.0 347.7 62.0 44.2 47.7 29.4
Full-time labor equivalents currently employed on farm 2.0 1.9 0.0 25.0 2.0 1.1 1.9 1.8
Specialized dairy farm (0/1) 0.5 0.5 0 1 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5
Specific issues concerning succession and closure
Number of generations farm is in family ownership (1..5)3 3.6 1.1 1 5 3.6 1.1 3.4 1.1
Farmland will be leased out after closure (0/1) - - - - - - 0.8 0.4
Farmland will be sold after closure (0/1) - - - - - - 0.3 0.5
Current manager wants to continue active farming as long as possible 
(0/1)
- - - - - - 0.3 0.5
Observations 233 134 47
Notes: 1 coded as: 0=no degree; 1=completed apprenticeship (Lehre); 2= master craftsman’s certificate (Meisterbrief) or equivalent; 3=completed university of 
applied sciences (Fachhochschule); 4=completed university. 2 coded as: 1=totally irrelevant; 2=rather irrelevant; 3=of medium relevance; 4=rather relevant; 
5=very relevant. 3 5 means five or more generations.
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Table 2: Results of the econometric analysis
Probability of 
succession
Years until 
succession
Years until closure
Variable Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Constant -1.561 -1.19 26.364 *** 7.35 35.749 *** 4.24
Age of current farm manager (years) 0.092 *** 4.81 -0.479 *** -10.40 -0.641 *** -5.58
Agricultural education of current manager (0..4) -0.038 -0.27 0.361 1.11 0.592 0.79
Non-agricultural education of current manager (0..4) 0.144 0.62 1.289 *** 2.81 3.387 * 1.75
Off-farm employment of current manager 
(hours/month)
0.005 1.31 -0.001 -0.08 0.026 1.20
Current manager perceives own age as an important 
criterion for timing of succession (1..5)
- - 0.564 ** 2.33 0.622 0.74
Current manager perceives own health as an important 
criterion for timing of succession (1..5)
- - 0.216 0.95 1.575 *** 2.60
Current manager perceives income tax regulations as 
an important criterion for timing of succession (1..5) 2
- - -0.568 *** -3.15 0.224 0.47
Current manager perceives public pension regulations 
as an important criterion for timing of succession 
(1..5) 2
- - 0.485 ** 2.54 -0.134 -0.30
Age difference to oldest child (years) -0.150 *** -5.50 - - - -
Successor has agricultural education (0/1) - - -1.090 -1.52 - -
Successor has non-agricultural education (0/1) - - 0.964 ** 2.05 - -
Number of sons 0.049 0.35 - - - -
Number of daughters -0.439 *** -3.25 - - - -
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Farm profit (‘000 EUR, av. 1998-2001) 0.007 ** 2.26 0.003 0.48 0.003 0.21
Farm-owned landholdings (ha, av. 1998-2001) 0.009 ** 2.32 0.006 0.81 0.018 0.71
Full-time labor equivalents currently employed on 
farm 
-0.057 -0.94 -0.643 *** -2.87 -0.154 -0.40
Specialized dairy farm (0/1) 0.800 *** 2.95 -0.700 -1.12 2.276 1.40
Number of generations farm is in family ownership 
(1..5)
0.129 1.27 0.357 * 1.68 0.345 0.66
Farmland will be leased out after closure (0/1) - - - - -3.877 ** -2.57
Farmland will be sold after closure (0/1) - - - - -0.529 -0.41
Current manager wants to continue active farming as 
long as possible (0/1)
- - - - 2.202 * 1.90
Inverse Mills Ratio - - 1.828 ** 1.96 4.527 *** 2.80
Observations 233 134 47
McFadden’s R² 0.343
LR test ( 2 )(p-value) 99.2 (<0.001)
Predicted 1s that were actual 1s  (%) 85.5
Predicted 0s that were actual 0s  (%) 73.1
F-value (p-value) 11.4 (<0.001) 8.6 (<0.001)
Adjusted R² 0.632 0.791
Notes: For coding of categorial variables see notes to Table 1. Each regression also contains a set of six regional dummy variables. t-values of OLS models 
corrected for selection according to Heckman (1979). *** (**; *)= significantly different from zero at the 0.01 (0.05; 0.1) level.
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